What the EU and its member states have committed to Ukraine since 24 February 2022

The Kiel count, the same one used in the country map. It sits below the Commission figure at the top of this page because the scope is drawn differently. The dashed line is not a forecast of the war — it only extends decisions already taken.

Construction per country and month: the country's measured bilateral aid plus that same month's aid from the EU institutions, allocated by the country's share of the EU budget. That share is held constant across the whole period; in reality it varies slightly. 2026 is measured through June. For the months after that and for 2027, only the undisbursed part of the €90bn loan is counted — bilateral aid is not carried forward, because no decision exists for it. The last two bars are therefore a lower bound, not an expected value.

Two separate quantities, added together: the share carried through the EU budget, which the Kiel Institute attributes using each country's actual budget contribution, plus the bilateral aid given directly. This count totals €192.0bn and does not match the Commission's €220.2bn above — a different scope, not a contradiction. The projection distributes the overall pace across countries in proportion.

• Starting value of the main counter. €220.2bn as of 21 August 2026, the European Commission's official figure. The counter starts there and adds elapsed time at the selected scenario's rate. Nothing is estimated that the Commission has not itself reported.
• Where the pace comes from. The total rose from €193bn (31 Dec 2025) to €220.2bn — €27.2bn in 232 days, or €42.8bn a year. The two starting figures come from different publications and are not fully comparable in method; the derived rate is therefore an estimate, not an official value.
• Two number systems, deliberately side by side. The main counter follows the Commission (€220.2bn). The country map and both charts follow the Kiel Institute's Ukraine Support Tracker (€192.0bn and €194.6bn). The gap comes from different scope — the Commission counts refugee costs inside member states, the Kiel Institute does not. Both figures are correct. They have not been reconciled, because reconciling them would misrepresent the sources.
• How the country attribution works. Aid carried through the EU budget is allocated by each member state's actual budget contribution. That allocation is not ours — it comes from the Kiel Institute's own dataset (worksheet EU Aid Shares). Bilateral aid given directly is added on top. Both quantities are shown separately in the table and can be checked individually.
• Population figures. The EU-wide per-resident value divides by 452.0 million (Eurostat, 1 January 2026). Country values divide by that country's own population (Eurostat, 1 January 2025). The country figures sum to 450.6 million — the 1.4 million difference is the one-year gap and changes no conclusion.
• The trajectory line. 53 monthly values from the Kiel dataset, column EU members and institutions. An adjacent column reports €373.5bn — that is all donors worldwide including the US and the UK. That figure is deliberately not used here, because it says nothing about the EU.
• The annual bars. They show what each single year adds, not the accumulated total. The same population is used for every year; it varies by less than one percent and would not change the conclusion. The peak is 2025, not somewhere in the future.
• What the dashed parts are. Not a forecast of the war. They spread only the already-decided but undisbursed part of the €90bn loan evenly to the end of 2027. If disbursement runs differently, the split between years shifts — the sum does not.
• Loans are included. The largest single item is loans, not grants. They burden budgets only insofar as they default or are not covered by proceeds from immobilised Russian assets. Per resident is therefore an allocation, not a tax bill.
• Refugee costs do not go to Ukraine. The €17bn is spending that occurs inside the member states themselves. It sits in the Commission figure, not in the Kiel figure — one of the reasons the two differ.
• Immobilised Russian assets. Whether the resulting revenues may be used permanently is not settled under international law. The figures assume they stay available — a favourable assumption. If it does not hold, the amount does not vanish: the liability sits with the EU budget, and therefore with the member states.
• The counter smooths. Money actually arrives in tranches, not by the second. The running numbers illustrate a pace; they do not represent bookings. Between two data releases, every decimal is arithmetic, not measurement.
• Please check the arithmetic. Every starting value is linked under Sources, and the raw data is published as data.json. This site does not judge whether the spending is right, too high or too low — it shows a sum and discloses how it arises.